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Antiabortion Rhetoric and the Undermining of Choice: Women’s 
Agency as Causing “Psychological Trauma” Following the 
Termination of a Pregnancy
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Canterbury Christ Church University
Historically the antiabortion movement has opposed abortions through reference to the fetus’ human status. 
However, recently there has been a rhetorical shift whereby abortion is criticized based on its alleged negative 
psychological impact on women, with some authors voicing concerns related to this medicalized repertoire 
undermining women’s capacity to act as rational decision-makers. However, no research to date has 
systematically analyzed how women’s agency over their abortions features in antiabortion rhetoric. In this 
article, through a discourse analysis of interviews with 15 antiabortion supporters, I explore how psychological 
concepts are employed to indirectly undermine women’s agency to abort. Participants construct the termination 
of a pregnancy as psychologically damaging when women’s agency is evident (e.g., in abortions or rape-
pregnancy abortions). Women’s choice also appears as enforced by society, victimizing them and removing 
accountability over it. However, unintentional termination (e.g., miscarriage) is constructed as “natural” and 
psychologically harmless due to the lack of agency. Overall, the pathologization of abortion through reference 
to psychological trauma stemming from the exercise of agency allows antiabortionists to naturalize motherhood 
and oppose abortions in an “objective,” depoliticized, nonrestrictive, and prowoman manner, without explicitly 
disregarding women’s ability to choose or breaching Western norms of autonomy and freedom of choice.
KEY WORDS: trauma, framing, motherhood, antiabortion, abortion, identity construction
As a result of the Enlightenment, the modern individualized, Western subject is perceived as 
agentic—as possessing the rationality and ability to decide for personal and public matters (Allport, 
1968). Conceptualizing the self in agentic terms provides individuals with a repertoire that enables 
individual and collective action (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). Contemporary social psychological re-
search assumes and operates on the basis of this dominant cultural norm, paying significant attention 
to collective action processes. This strand of research has been largely influenced by the concepts 
of identity and empowerment (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000; van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009), as well as by the action orientation of lan-
guage (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), exploring how social actors rhetorically 
(re)define group categories in strategic ways when engaging in collective mobilization processes 




In this article, I shift the analytic focus on the ways that social movement supporters negotiate 
the agency of particular actors of interest to act in their own terms, and particularly in instances 
when the latter act in ways that are counternormative to the movement. This question becomes par-
ticularly important when considering Western values regarding individual autonomy and freedom of 
choice. More specifically, I focus on the abortion debate and explore how women’s agency to choose 
abortion features in interviews with antiabortion activists. Taking into account the dilemmatic and 
argumentative nature of social life (Billig, 1987; Billig et al., 1988), I examine how participants 
try to undermine abortion as a legitimate response to a pregnancy, without explicitly disregarding 
women’s agency to choose over reproductive matters. Of particular interest are instances whereby 
participants employ medicalized (Lee, 2003) and psychological (Edwards, 1999; Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Papastamou, 1986) discourses to construct women’s choice in relation to their agency.
Considering the ongoing restrictions to the provision of abortion-related information (Boseley, 
Maclean, & Ford, 2017), as well as the increasing prevalence of psychological concepts in antiabor-
tion argumentation (APA, Major, & Association, 2008; Dadlez & Andrews, 2010), an analysis of 
how women’s agency features in antiabortion rhetoric is a topic worth exploring.
Constructing Social Problems and Identity
Social movements strive to mobilize support that will legitimize their actions towards specific 
social problems. However, social problems do not exist a priori; rather, if particular courses of action 
are to be proposed and mobilized, a social issue should be actively constructed as problematic, and 
this redefinition should be seen as legitimate (Blumer, 1971). Blumer’s argument influenced subse-
quent sociological research on framing (cf. Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 2002). Frames 
refer to versions of social objects that “help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby 
function to organize experience and guide action” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614), providing the 
lens through which certain issues, things, or events will be seen as relevant and important or not. 
Language and argumentation are central in mobilization processes whereby the content of relevant 
symbols and the context of the debate are redefined in an attempt to establish who has what at stake 
(Cobb & Elder, 1973; Elder & Cobb, 1983).
The centrality of language in constructing versions of reality also features within social psychol-
ogy and is of direct relevance to framing analyses (Jasper, 2017) since it offers useful insights into 
the microprocesses of argumentation and problem construction. For example, the content, breadth, 
and norms of social identities—who is “us,” “them,” and what the associated aims and preferred 
courses of action are—can be strategically manipulated for particular purposes (Reicher et al., 2006; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005). For example, when talking to 
an audience of medics, antiabortion speakers attempt to present themselves as members of a common 
category with the former, frame the medical profession as aligned with the antiabortion cause, and 
construct abortion as being at odds with the medical profession (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).
Psychological language can be of particular rhetorical potency in mobilization processes, since 
it can be mobilized to problematize social issues and promote one’s political positions in a rather 
depoliticized, “objective” manner (Hopkins, Reicher, & Saleem, 1996; Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018). 
Similarly, emotion language can be used to work up versions of actions, identities, and events in 
flexible ways depending on speakers’ orientations, connoting either rationality and authenticity or 
irrationality and subjectivity (Edwards, 1999). However, rhetorical constructions are not rhetori-
cally potent by nature but should be worked up as factual and realistic, with speakers often employ-
ing psychological concepts to manage issues of stake and accountability (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 1996). For example, researchers have explored the rhetorical resources that social actors often 
mobilize to account for certain phenomena such as racism (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Xenitidou & 
Sapountzis, 2018) and asylum seeking (Burke & Goodman, 2012; Every & Augoustinos, 2008; 
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Kirkwood, Goodman, McVittie, & McKinlay, 2016). This strand of research also offers useful in-
sights into the ways that social actors attend to and negotiate dilemmas of stake (Potter, 1996) and 
broader ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell, 1998), such as the articulation of racist 
positions with the parallel disavowal of racism for oneself.
The literature cited above can be particularly insightful, especially when our concern is to ex-
plore how social actors define social issues (e.g., abortion) as problematic and worthy of mobilizing 
support towards resistance. Moreover, they can be useful in exploring the rhetorical resources—with 
an emphasis on psychological concepts—they draw on to characterize (and especially undermine or 
build up) particular categories involved in the debate.
Abortion in Contestation
Considering the complex historical development of the abortion debate and its variation across 
different national and cultural contexts (Condit, 1990; Morgan, 1989), my aim is not to present a 
detailed timeline of the debate’s evolution; rather, I will briefly outline the main arguments employed 
by the antiabortion movement, paying attention to their rhetorical advantages or weaknesses in rela-
tion to the antiabortion movement mobilizing support.
The issues raised in the abortion debate often extend beyond its status as an issue merely con-
cerning health care (Purcell, Brown, Melville, & McDaid, 2017) and mainly concern the status of 
the fetus as a human person. One of the arguments employed to argue for the fetus’ humanity and 
oppose abortion is based on a religious discourse of “ensoulment” (Kelley, Evans, & Headey, 1993; 
Tribe, 1992), suggesting that the presence of a soul in the fetus renders it a human being and thus 
positions abortion an illegitimate response to a pregnancy. Conceptually, Catholic figures and schol-
ars from as early as the 18th century considered abortion to be a sin. However, despite that the 
embryo was treated as alive, it was not perceived as de facto possessing a fully grown human soul. 
Rather, abortion was considered homicide only at later stages of development, when the process of 
“hominization” had occurred (Maienschein, 2007). Nevertheless, religious repertoires were prob-
lematic for various reasons; the rise of secularism and the subsequent decline of religious sentiments 
made it hard to attract supporters outside religious communities as well as persuade women to not 
choose abortion (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992; Hopkins et al., 1996). Moreover, antiabortionists were 
accused of focusing on abstract religious doctrines rather than on pressing practical issues such as 
women’s health and well-being (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992).
The rise of feminist movements advocated for abortion as a women’s right, which caused the 
antiabortion movement to develop a different line of argumentation that focused on fetal rights 
(Daniels, 1993; Himmelweit, 1988; Hopkins et al., 1996). The fetus is claimed to possess the status 
of a human person (and the associated indispensable rights to life that come with it) while avoid-
ing references to religious concepts (Cannold, 2002). Photographic imagery was used to support 
this construction by depicting the fetus as an individual, autonomous human being (Condit, 1990; 
Hopkins, Zeedyk, & Raitt, 2005; Petchesky, 1987), offering antiabortion positions a sense of neu-
trality and objectivity. However, antiabortionists were accused of focusing entirely on the fetus, 
presenting a one-sided symbiotic relationship, presenting women’s bodies in a hostile way and 
finally removing women from the overall picture (Condit, 1990; Hopkins & Reicher, 1997; Hopkins 
et al., 1996; Stabile, 1992). Nevertheless, the importance of category definition (e.g., “fetus” vs. 
“unborn child”) is evident in its ability to shape public attitudes (Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015) as 
well as opinion-based group memberships, with important implications for collective action (Bliuc, 
McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007) (hence in this article I refer to the protagonists of the debate 
as “proabortion” and “antiabortion.”
A third line of antiabortion argumentation includes the use of psychological language and con-
cerns the newly invented post-abortion syndrome (PAS; Speckhard & Rue, 1992). PAS was based on 
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the concept of post-traumatic stress disorder and suggested that women could suffer negative psy-
chological consequences following an abortion due to the disruption of motherhood and nurturance 
(Kelly, 2014; Lowe & Page, 2018). The existence of PAS was officially denounced by the American 
Psychological Association (APA et al., 2008) and so was the said psychological traumatic nature 
of abortions in general (Adler et al., 1990; Biggs, Upadhyay, McCulloch, & Foster, 2017; Dadlez 
& Andrews, 2010; Munk-Olsen, Laursen, Pedersen, Lidegaard, & Mortensen, 2011; Robinson, 
Stotland, Russo, Lang, & Occhiogrosso, 2009). Nevertheless, PAS was quickly diffused in public 
discourse and state policies (Kelly, 2014; Rose, 2011; Saurette & Gordon, 2013) and benefited the 
antiabortion movement. First, the employment of psychological discourses allowed antiabortionists 
to identify all post-abortive women as potentially traumatized and oppose abortion on the basis of 
“objective” medical rather than moral criteria (Hopkins et al., 1996; Lee, 2003). Second, it allowed 
them to avoid characterizations of being “anti-choice” and rather present themselves as prowomen 
and as representing their health and interests (Cannold, 2002; Friedman, 2013; Lee, 2003; Ntontis & 
Hopkins, 2018; Saurette & Gordon, 2013). A corollary is that supporters of abortion were undermined 
as irrational and as harmful for women (Hopkins et al., 1996; Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018; Rose, 2011).
The lines of argumentation briefly outlined above vary by time and cultural and national contexts. 
For example, whereas U.S. antiabortion rhetoric is critical of women, through appeals to religious 
discourses and uses of fetal-center arguments, antiabortionists in Canada adopt a prowoman position, 
avoid religious argumentation, and argue for the impact of abortion on women’s mental health (Saurette 
& Gordon, 2013). On the contrary, Greek antiabortion activists are closely connected to and attempt 
to drive change through the Orthodox Church, which as of the summer of 2019, decided to introduce 
a “Day for the Unborn Child,” emphasizing the fetus’ humanity due to its closeness to the image of 
God (Vice, 2019). Also, the definition of “sin” varies across national contexts. Whereas in the United 
States, abortion is conceptualized as a sin due to “murder,” in Ecuador sin is based on objections to self- 
mutilation (Morgan, 1997). Based on the above, and due to the nature of the interview data, my analysis 
only concerns antiabortion argumentation in the U.K. (see Hopkins & Reicher, 1992; Hopkins et al., 
1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) and perhaps the United States (see Lee, 2003).
Nevertheless, the various repertoires used to oppose abortion directly or indirectly address wom-
en’s agency—their capacity to act—over their bodies. For example, the fetal-centered discourse that 
constructed the fetus as a baby and emphasized its right to life indirectly constructed women as ratio-
nal albeit immoral decision-makers whose unethical choice led to an abortion. However, others argue 
that the newly adopted, women-centered, psychological discourse “focuses on pregnant women's 
claimed lack of agency and consequent incapacity to ‘really’ choose (with all that word connotes) 
abortion” (Cannold, 2002, p. 172; emphasis added). By victimizing women and questioning their 
agency over their choices, undoubtedly antiabortionists gain a political advantage. However, directly 
denying women’s capability to decide over their bodies would possess a similar Achilles’ heel to 
antiabortion discourses: It would oppose Western norms of individual agency and would leave anti-
abortionists open to accusations of restricting women’s choice.
Agency and Psychology
Denying one’s agency to act for oneself contradicts the notion of individuality, the basis of the 
Western self and appropriate codes of conduct. The Enlightenment movement identified in humans 
rationality and agency to deal with their personal matters (Hamilton, 1992). Crucially, advocating 
for reason within the realms of everyday life meant promoting tolerance and established the norm 
against prejudice, giving rise to particular rhetorical/ideological dilemmas concerning the prob-
lematic nature of prejudgment (Billig et al., 1988). Meyer and Jepperson (2000) argue that, in the 
post-Enlightenment secular periods that followed, the abandonment of religious narratives passed 
authority from religious figures to individuals themselves that were now perceived as able to act for 
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themselves, and for others, in the name of grand narratives (e.g., science, ethics, morality) in support 
of the imagined interests of nonactor entities within our particular cultural systems such as ecosys-
tem or nations, as well as in the name of imagined potential actors such as fetuses, social groups, 
or classes (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). Thus, individual and collective action can be seen as direct 
outcomes of the recognition of agency within the Western subject. The tautology of the Western 
individual self with agency assumes its presence within all Western subjects (Walkerdine, 2003), pro-
motes the celebration of values such as autonomy and freedom of choice, and facilitates the concept 
of self-realization that can be achieved through particular psychological technologies (Rose, 1999).
Within the mainstream psychological literature, agency is a core tenet of social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 2000, 2006). Bandura (2000), like Meyer and Jepperson (2000), identifies three forms of 
agency—individual, collective, and proxy. In his model, collective action is an outcome of collective 
agency—the belief that people can act together towards the realization of shared goals, with efficacy 
playing a key role. However, in the social psychological literature, agency often manifests as an 
explanatory concept or as a dependent variable. For example, Jay and Muldoon (2018) discuss how 
different modes of agency (independent vs. interdependent) employed by middle-class and work-
ing-class students accordingly can facilitate or become barriers to education. Research on collective 
action suggests that agency is an outcome of collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), 
whereas other researchers equate agency with empowerment that also stems from participants shar-
ing a social identity (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009).
The Present Study
In this article, I treat agency as a topic of analysis and focus on the ways that members of particu-
lar groups negotiate the agency of others to act on their own terms. Despite being in broad agreement 
with Cannold (2002), I argue that antiabortion supporters cannot directly oppose women’s agency 
over their choice to terminate their pregnancies, since this would lead them to oppose Western norms 
about the individuality of the self. At the same time, I disagree with the claim that the simple in-
vocation of a psychological repertoire will automatically lead to the dismissal of women’s agency. 
Rather, what should be closely investigated are the microprocesses of how antiabortionists talk about 
women’s choice to terminate a pregnancy, how they attempt to dismiss the agency of the latter with-
out breaching modern norms of freedom of choice, and the role of psychological concepts within 
the arena of argumentation. This will unavoidably entail the negotiation of particular rhetorical and 
ideological dilemmas such as managing a tolerant profile while promoting repressive antiabortion 
positions (Billig et al., 1988).
Method
Participants and Interviews
Fifteen antiabortion supporters were interviewed in Scotland in 2014–15. Participants were nine 
female and six male antiabortion supporters living in three major Scottish cities. Five participants 
identified as English, three as Irish, and seven as Scottish. The age of 12 participants ranged between 
18 and 26 years old, while three participants were in their mid-40s. Seven participants were employed, 
six were undergraduate, and two were postgraduate students. One participant willing to discuss his 
opinions of the antiabortion movement acted as a gatekeeper for me to gain access and interview 
three further participants. I identified the rest of the sample through antiabortion Facebook groups. I 
contacted them and asked whether they would be willing to discuss women’s experiences of abortion 
and the positions of the antiabortion movement. Participants were active in local antiabortion groups 
across the three cities, and some participated in weekly silent vigils on the central town squares.
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The interviews followed a semistructured format (M length = 44 min, SD = 24, total duration =  
617 min) and were conducted in participants’ working offices or in cafeterias. Apart from two par-
ticipants that were interviewed as a couple, the rest were interviewed individually. Interviews were 
audio-recorded with participants’ consent and were fully transcribed. Ethical approval was given by 
the University of Dundee, United Kingdom, and all participants have been given pseudonyms. The 
interviews primarily focused on women’s experiences of abortion, the antiabortion movement’s po-
sitions, as well as other social actors implicated within the broader debate that surrounds abortions, 
such as feminists and medical professionals. Some questions were not preplanned but were added 
after data collection had begun.
Despite identifying myself as a supporter of free access to abortion, the atmosphere surrounding 
the interviews was friendly and mutually respectful. Participants were not tricked into believing that 
I was an antiabortion supporter—in certain instances I was asked and was clear about my proabortion 
stance, which did not cause any problems in the interviewing process. Also, due to the controversial 
nature of the topic under consideration, in certain occasions I introduced counterarguments where 
appropriate, which assisted me in gaining a more thorough view in the discursive strategies and re-
sources employed by antiabortion supporters. I consider that interview data can be used to explore 
public antiabortion rhetoric. Participants were fully aware of my “outsider” and researcher status. 
Therefore, and as it will become apparent in the analysis, it is very likely that participants identified 
the issues at stake (e.g., in relation to their public profile) and formulated their responses in ways 
appropriate for public consumption, using arguments common in public antiabortion argumentation.
Analytic Procedure
My analysis draws on the discourse analytic tradition in social psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). On the one hand, I was interested in microprocesses of account-
ability management, the construction of realism, and the employment of psychological concepts 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). However, I was also interested in top-down, macroprocesses 
and hence was influenced by poststructuralist strands of analysis that concern positioning as well 
as the historicity and ideological roots and implications of the discourses employed by participants, 
so I used Critical Discursive Social Psychology (CDSP hereafter; Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999).
I present the results in two sections; first, I present extracts in which women’s agency is directly 
implicated in the termination of the pregnancy (e.g., abortions or abortions following a rape preg-
nancy). Next, I discuss instances where women’s choice is not directly related to the termination 
of the pregnancy (e.g., miscarriages). The links between women’s agency (or its lack thereof) over 
abortion and following trauma were common strands of argumentation, which justifies the format of 
the presentation.
Results
Agency Over the Termination Leads to Psychological Trauma
Women’s active role in terminating a pregnancy was treated as a precursor to trauma.
Extract 1
Ian: It would be my understanding that it [abortion] would [affect women]. I think everyone 
reacts differently, it would, I think that trauma of essentially killing your child or fetus has to 
have an effect.
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Abortion was commonly constructed as traumatic for women. Despite moderating his argument 
through hedging (“I think”; “it would”) and extreme case formulations (“everyone”) to guard against 
counterarguments of women unaffected by their abortions, Ian advances a version of abortion as 
murder (“killing”). The representation of the fetus as a “child” indirectly positions women as moth-
ers and carries connotations about norms between the pair (e.g., nurturing relationship). Meanwhile, 
the parallel identification of both the “child” and “fetus” categories is used to place emphasis on the 
act (“killing”) rather than on the label (“fetus” vs. “child”) and the debate associated with it. Overall, 
action taken by women to terminate the pregnancy was sometimes treated as counternormative and 
as disrupting the natural process of motherhood (also see Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018). Thus, women’s 
agency was constructed as self-harm, which allowed antiabortionists to legitimize their positions 
without directly referring to issues surrounding women’s choice.
Next, I consider how participants talk about agency over the process of abortion as harmful for 
women.
Extract 2
Dan: … before the method of abortion would have been by vacuum aspiration, so a long tube 
with a sharp end would, like a kitchen implement, you put it in when you want to make, chop 
meat or something, you know that is exactly what it makes and but now it’s much more chemi-
cal. And when that method of abortion was first coming along, even the company that made it, 
the chairman said that this is a terrible psychological ordeal, this is the guy that made abortion 
pill because he said from a psychological point of view if you go into a hospital this is some-
thing the doctor did to you. If it’s three pills there that you take and swallow and put in your own 
mouth, you know it’s much harder to rationalize that this is something that happened, “this is 
something that I did to myself”
Women’s agency also featured in different methods of abortion. Dan first uses vivid description 
(“chop meat”; “sharp end”) to create an unpleasant image of abortion through vacuum aspiration. 
He then discusses the second method (“pill”) and compares it to the first one along the lines of their 
psychological impact on women. Despite its apparently less unpleasant character, the “pill” is con-
structed as more harmful for women due to women’s agentic state over the process. Whereas in vac-
uum aspiration women are positioned as lacking agency over the process (“something the doctor did 
to you”), with regard to the pill women are positioned as active agents of their abortions (“you take 
and swallow and put in your own mouth”), which is depicted as impacting their coping processes 
(“much harder to rationalize”). Thus, abortion was delegitimized through reference to the traumatic 
outcomes of agency, which was reformulated as a form of self-harm.
In other occasions, agency was delegitimized based on the impact it can have on others.
Extract 3
Jennifer: there are also men that, like, suffer from a lot of things like emotional trauma and 
things after an abortion because
Interviewer: Really?
Jennifer: Well there are cases of that because they feel they’ve lost a child too and there are, 
if you’d look it up online, I’m sure there are testimonies of guys and they did have an abortion 
against their wishes and of course it’s not their body but, so I’m not saying that we should be 
allowed to stop, you know, stop women from doing things but we should recognize that men 
and other family members, not just the fathers can also be affected by abortion, because, just 
as if a child, there was a miscarriage of a child that died can affect men and even grandmothers 
or whatever. It’s not just the mother, so it’s, should be a whole [inaudible] not just the woman’s 
body, it’s the child and the wider family place.
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In certain occasions, it appeared that men were also constructed as victims of abortion, and, in 
the case of Jennifer, the trauma was depicted in psychological terms. Explicating upon her initial 
statement, Jennifer identifies embryos as children and indirectly positions men as fathers, which 
allows her to warrant a version of abortion as parental loss. She uses systematic vagueness (“there 
are cases of that”; “there are testimonies of guys”) to avoid providing further details, while leaving it 
up to me to establish the veracity of her argument (“if you look it up online”). The naturalization of 
fatherhood has multiple functions. First, it constructs abortion as incompatible with fatherhood—a 
father would never kill his child (“against their wishes”). Second, this incompatibility is explicated 
in terms of psychopathology arising in men. Finally, and most importantly, it undermines abortion 
as a legitimate choice for women to respond to a pregnancy by identifying women’s agency (and 
men’s lack of agency) as the precursor to the trauma. By attempting to promote an argument that 
could have been heard as illiberal and as restricting women’s choice, Jennifer faces a dilemma of 
stake (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) between individual 
liberty and intolerance. She overcomes the stake dilemma through a disclaimer (“of course it’s not 
their [men’s] body”; “I’m not saying we should stop women from doing things”) before accounting 
for her illiberal positions by emphasizing the emotional damage that family members can suffer due 
to women’s actions. Thus, potential accusations of intolerance towards women’s choices are avoided 
through the pathologization of women’s choices and calls for consideration of further injustices.
Women’s agency was also discussed in relation to abortion after rape.
Extract 4
Anna: … the trauma happened because of the rape, not because of the child and I’m not saying 
that a mother would necessarily have to keep her child or, but I think like adoption is certainly 
an option and, but it’s a very difficult question. I think when so many people use that question 
they create again a kind of societal stigma against rape and things that you can’t possibly keep 
your child if it’s been conceived in rape and so it becomes like a norm, it becomes like a show 
held belief but if you conceive during rape you have to abort it because all of society thinks that 
that child is valueless.
Interviewer: Yeah but I think that if she has the, she’s raped and she has a trauma from this, if 
she has an abortion isn’t there a chance that she might actually feel better or more relaxed (Anna: 
umhm) let’s say.
Anna: But it could also cause more trauma, well, so, it could also cause, not only has she had the 
pain of being raped but she’s also having the pain of having to admit a really difficult decision 
because of that, it’s almost like you’re giving back, the rapist has control over her body, now 
she has to abort a child, now she has to go through a medical procedure because he attacked her.
Since in public discourse a rape pregnancy can automatically be perceived as traumatic for women, 
it was common for antiabortion participants to identify the causal factor of the trauma outside the 
pregnancy itself. In this case, Anna refers to the pregnancy as a “child” and juxtaposes it to the rape, 
identifying the latter as the causal factor of trauma. This allows her to separate between rape and 
pregnancy as well as to depathologize the pregnancy and remain in line with the norms of the anti-
abortion movement.
Anna also faces an ideological dilemma between individual liberty and intolerance (Billig et al., 
1988), since she is trying to promote an argument against abortions in a context that advocates for 
freedom of choice. To avoid the dilemma and guard against accusations of being intolerant, Anna 
starts with a disclaimer (“I am not saying that …”) before stating that a rape pregnancy should be 
continued and followed by adoption. Moreover, to avoid blaming women for terminating rather than 
continuing rape pregnancies, Anna proceeds to an external attribution by identifying society as the 
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immoral agent that stigmatizes and eventually shapes women’s decisions. Thus, even though women 
are treated as agents, responsibility for their actions is located within a broader framework that serves 
to victimize them and absolve them of blame.
Common also were arguments against the psychological benefits for women that aborted a rape 
pregnancy—an abortion was not constructed as a remedy to the rape, but rather as a second trauma 
(“she’s also having the pain”). Another participant explicitly said that an abortion after rape “is a 
trauma on top of a trauma.” Anna recontextualizes the psychological nature of the choice to abort 
after rape from something positive (“might feel better or more relaxed”) to something negative (“the 
pain”; “a really difficult decision”). Moreover, women are not positioned as genuinely deciding 
to abort but as “admitting,” which undermines the strength and value of their choice. Agency and 
control over one’s body again played a major role in Anna’s account. Abortion following rape is not 
constructed as giving women agency and control over their body but is rather framed as a loss of 
control (“you’re giving back”) and as control by the rapist. Thus, despite choosing to abort, women 
are not constructed as the actual agents (“she has to abort”; “has to go through a medical procedure”) 
and cannot be held accountable for their actions.
In this section, I focused on how antiabortion supporters linked women’s agency over their 
abortions with psychological trauma as a means of delegitimizing it as a valid means of responding 
to a pregnancy. Next, I explore how antiabortionists discuss the termination of a pregnancy in which 
women had no agency whatsoever and how this is related to psychological trauma.
Unintentional Termination as Not Traumatic
Essentially, an abortion and a miscarriage carry a common characteristic—the process of preg-
nancy is terminated. Also, while women in both instances might experience some distress, this 
should not be pathologized and referred to as a syndrome (Dadlez & Andrews, 2010). Nevertheless, 
participants themselves distinguished between women’s responses to the two instances.
Extract 5
Interviewer: Do you think there are any differences between how women process an abortion 
and then women who go through a miscarriage?
Gemma: Yeah definitely, it’s accepted for a woman to grieve a miscarriage, it’s not accepted for 
women to grieve an abortion.
Gemma accounted for differences in the coping process between the two instances in terms of 
norms of appropriate social conduct. The absence of a specific subject that endorses such norms 
(“it is accepted”) allows Gemma to present her statement as universal rather than only applying to 
her own group. Thus, social permission to grieve appears as conditional, depending on the respon-
sibility that women had over the termination (“accepted to grieve a miscarriage”; “not accepted to 
grieve an abortion”). This allows Gemma to condemn abortion on the basis of societal judgment 
linked to women’s responsibility over it, rather than through without explicit reference to antiabor-
tion argumentation.
In other cases, participants explicitly related agency over a termination with psychological 
trauma.
Extract 6
Jennifer: things might sometimes be worse for women that had abortions cause they didn’t have 
a miscarriage, cause they might be, feel like guilty whereas if you have a miscarriage you mourn, 




Interviewer: About the issue of miscarriage, I think I heard in a talk, can a miscarriage actually 
hurt a woman as much as an abortion? Or it’s.
Maria: Well, the woman in the miscarriage will have the grief and the loss and she may have 
some aspects of guilt thinking “did I do something” ehm, “to cause the miscarriage” but for the 
woman in abortion, she is the one that everyone has said that it was her decision to make (I: oh) 
and ehm, [inaudible] “I was the one who walked through the door”
In extract 6, even though both miscarriages and abortions are characterized as distressing for 
women, the latter are undermined by being represented as particularly damaging (“things might 
sometimes be worse for women that had abortions”). The speaker accounts by differentiating be-
tween the feelings that can arise following the procedure. Miscarriage is constructed as a natural pro-
cess over which women have no particular agency (“there’s nothing you could have done to prevent 
it”), with mourning being identified as the expected outcome. However, abortion is constructed as 
accompanied by a different emotional response—that of “guilt”—which, juxtaposed to the repertoire 
of “miscarriage as a natural process,” identifies women’s intentionality as the causal factor. Guilt as 
a form of regret, delegitimizes abortion through women’s supposedly own psychological reactions 
rather than on political grounds and allows Jennifer to undermine women’s agency without explicitly 
disregarding their ability to choose—the choice is undermined by being constructed as damaging in 
itself rather than through political argumentation.
Similarly, in Extract 7, Maria associates miscarriages with negative feelings such as grief, loss, 
and guilt. However, guilt after a miscarriage appears as qualitatively different to guilt that follows 
an abortion; while women in a miscarriage feel guilt in terms of any possible unintentional action 
that caused the termination of the pregnancy, guilt in an abortion is constructed as stemming from 
women’s active choices, formulated through active voicing (“I was the one who walked through 
the door”) as well as from social appraisals of the action that position it as normatively illegitimate 
(“everyone has said that it was her decision to make”). Discourses of “nature” and therefore lack of 
agency are juxtaposed to discourses of human agency and are treated as the decisive factors of wom-
en’s psychological responses and as speaking the truth about the inappropriate character of abortion 
(cf. Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018).
Finally, a detailed account of the role of agency in determining trauma following the termination 
of a pregnancy comes in Extract 8.
Extract 8
Bill: Miscarriage can be too severe psychologically and certainly cause psychiatric problems in 
some incidences, ehm [inaudible] but that’s going to happen in a number of instances, we can’t 
prevent miscarriages, if we can reduce these miscarriages, but the evidence would suggest that 
the adverse consequences of miscarriage are those associated with the death of a newborn child 
and an older child and it’s a question of dealing with grief and loss, those, an abortion, in an 
abortion grief and loss are confounded with a sense of responsibility towards the loss, perhaps 
blame others for placing her in a position where she had to take that choice. The miscarriage 
isn’t something determined by the woman’s choice, an abortion at least in the popular discourse 
is a thing that woman chooses even in situations where it’s the last things she wants, she is trying 
to resist it, she is trying to avoid it but at the end of the day if you buy the society tells you that 
was your choice and that’s very hard for women, it’s difficult.
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Bill constructs both miscarriages and abortions as having the potential to psychologically harm 
women. However, as noted earlier, it would be against the interests of the antiabortion movement to 
equate the impact of abortion with the impact of miscarriage, particularly when a main concern is the 
promotion of PAS as a particular outcome of abortions. To put it in another way, when an embryo is 
no longer inside a woman’s body, antiabortionists need to specify under what conditions women will 
suffer or not suffer trauma in a way that defends their political stance without claiming interest over 
women’s choices—or avoiding the ideological dilemma between freedom of choice and control over 
one’s body by external factors. Bill frames the topic in terms of prevention: If both miscarriages and 
abortions are traumatic for women (and Bill particularizes by saying “in some instances” to avoid 
counterarguments that refer to unaffected women), preventing these from happening will reduce the 
psychological strain. However, as Bill clearly states, it is precisely the lack of agency (“isn’t some-
thing determined by the woman’s choice”) that leads to grief and loss. Moreover, the embryo is con-
structed as a “child” implicitly positioning the woman as a mother. Like other participants, through 
referring to the lack of agency, Bill implicitly naturalizes miscarriage and therefore depathologizes 
its psychological impact. On the contrary, abortion is discussed in terms of women’s agency over 
it. As a result, it becomes traumatic because women took up this option, or because it is not natural 
(“confounded with a sense of responsibility”). This statement, however, leaves Bill open to a poten-
tial accusation of blaming women for their choice. As a result, he proceeds to a description which, 
on the one hand acknowledges women’s agency, but, on the other hand, constructs this agency as 
influenced by external factors. This is manifested in Bill’s account in which women “blame others” 
for forcing them to have an abortion (“placing her in a position where she had to take that choice”). 
Women’s attribution of blame to external agents for their abortion serves to ethically remove re-
sponsibility for the choice and render women unaccountable for their actions. Bill further positions 
women as victims by constructing their psychology during the choice in negative terms (“last thing 
she wants,” “trying to resist it,” “to avoid it”). The decision to abort is not an “actual choice,” but 
rather a normative response to societal norms that is reframed as a choice (“the society tells you that 
was your choice”).
Discussion
In this article, I explored how the agency of women over their choice to abort features in an-
tiabortion rhetoric. Despite agreeing with researchers arguing that the psychological discourse 
can strip women of their agency (Cannold, 2002), I suggested that such a dismissal would not be 
explicit—rather, antiabortionists would closely attend to Western norms of individual autonomy. 
Research (in the Canadian context) has argued that antiabortionists adopt a modern, individualistic, 
prowoman stance (Saurette & Gordon, 2013). This study complements such findings by arguing 
that, in line with this modern approach, agency is not dismissed at face value; rather, an exploration 
of the microprocesses surrounding the construction of the choice to abort shows that it is indirectly 
undermined through psychological trauma that manifests when women act upon their bodies in non-
normative-to-the-movement ways. This allows antiabortionists to depoliticize the debate and manage 
a prowoman profile.
In line with previous research (Hopkins et al., 1996), participants employed psychological con-
cepts to oppose abortion. These were intertwined in complex ways with women’s agency, so that 
abortion could be undermined without explicitly disregarding the latter. Women and embryos were 
positioned as mothers and babies (Hopkins et al., 1996, 2005; Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018) and war-
ranted the construction of abortion as traumatic, undermining the choice through its pathologization 
(rather than opposing it in explicitly political grounds). Similar was the case for trauma follow-
ing various methods of terminating a pregnancy (e.g., pills), for trauma to the wider family, or for 
trauma following rape pregnancies; acting upon one’s body in counternormative (to the antiabortion 
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movement) ways was pathologized, undermining the decision to abort through emphasis on self-
trauma. When antiabortionists faced the risk of blaming women as unethical for their choices (and 
thus distancing them from the movement), they constructed the decision as (in)directly enforced 
from society, removing accountability from women. On the contrary, involuntary termination of a 
pregnancy did not automatically result in trauma—rather, it was intentionality over the termination 
that was treated as inherently traumatic. Thus, antiabortionists do attempt to undermine women’s 
agency in general, but only regarding certain actions—that is, from aborting. Extending previous 
research (e.g., Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018), we show how agency is linked to intentionality over moth-
erhood; the capacity to act in terms of continuing the pregnancy is celebrated and is even treated as 
healing. This shows that antiabortionists are sensitive to cultural norms, manifested in the ideological 
dilemmas that become apparent in their argumentation (e.g., freedom vs. control).
The present analysis also helps bridge the gap between social movement studies and social psy-
chology (cf. Jasper, 2017). Social psychology, and particularly its discourse-oriented tradition, can 
enrich framing analyses by exploring the rhetorical microprocesses that surround framing issues and 
the employment of psychological concepts in political debates. The analysis clearly shows the im-
portance of considering social norms when investigating such processes: Norms do not simply oper-
ate in a psychological background guiding activists’ cognition but are actively attended and enacted 
upon. Considering how framings can shape decisions (Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015), exploring 
how psychological concepts can be used to pathologize and restrict people’s agency to act upon their 
bodies is a pressing concern. This is even more significant in instances of collective mobilization, 
where opposing groups strive to attract specific group members to their causes and steer them away 
from acting in terms of their opponents.
However, psychological discourses can have broader implications for the social and political 
sphere that are of direct relevance to political psychology and the study of social movements. Nikolas 
Rose (1996) has extensively discussed the expansion of psychology into all domains of social life, 
and the psychologized rhetoric of social movements cannot be excluded. Drawing heavily on Rose’s 
work, psychological discourses not only depoliticize debates (e.g., Hopkins et al., 1996; Ntontis & 
Hopkins, 2018), but they offer a novel means of conceptualizing social issues and effectively gov-
erning the social actors involved. I argue that claiming psychological expertise offers antiabortion-
ists authority that previous religious or ethical discourses did not. Psychology enables the authority 
exercised by antiabortionists to appear in a rather ethical and therapeutic manner, emphasizing and 
respecting the purported nature of the individual. Thus, rather than attempting to persuade women to 
alter their decisions, antiabortionists construct a therapist-patient relation, and any criticism towards 
one’s agency is not perceived as the violation of the latter but as a claim of truth. In the post-En-
lightenment era when human agency is taken for granted (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000), the adoption 
of psychological frameworks allows antiabortionists to exercise power of women’s actions while 
supposedly respecting their freedom. The latter is not negated, but any power exercised upon women 
occurs on the basis of the rationality that psychological expertise offers (Rose, 1996). Thus, psychol-
ogy grants antiabortionists the ability to undermine women's agency without explicitly disregarding 
their ability to choose: It renders their agency an area for psychological colonization and control. 
In this article, I argue that the discourse-oriented social psychological strand of research possesses 
invaluable theoretical, methodological, and analytical tools to explore those processes and strengthen 
the link between the sociological and social psychological exploration of political debates and by 
extent collective mobilization (cf. Jasper, 2017).
The study, however, is not without its limitations. The one-to-one interviews and my explicit 
proabortion position meant that no counterarguments were really offered other than prompts to fa-
cilitate discussion. It is very likely that due to norms against prejudice the same participants could 
have tailored their arguments to fit discussion with a nonsupporter, but in closed settings the lines 
of argumentation could be completely different. Also, due to the nature of the interviews, we cannot 
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know how the same arguments could be received by women or supporters of abortion. Psychological 
discourses might be more potent compared to religious ones, but their actual ability to shape public 
understandings of abortion and mobilize the public cannot be assumed. Last, the study is dependent 
on the U.K. context where psychology plays a key role in everyday life. However, antiabortionists in 
other Western or non-Western contexts could refer to women’s agency in completely different ways 
drawing on their respective cultural repertoires. Even within the Western context, the antiabortion 
argumentation is still flexible and draws on religious, ethical, and psychological repertoires.
Future research could address how agency features in the discourse of proabortion activists. In 
addition, of importance is the exploration of how particular dismissals of the agency to abort (e.g., 
on ethical or psychological grounds) are perceived by opposing groups. Of interest would also be 
the ways that women’s agency features in public antiabortion talks. Arguments might be radically 
different when accounting for in public audiences, so ethnographic work might be needed. Finally, 
since the topic concerns women’s agency, future research could explore how women themselves talk 
about their own choice to abort and the factors that shaped their decisions.
Overall, I have shown how psychological discourses allow antiabortionists to undermine wom-
en’s agency without explicitly disregarding their ability to choose abortion. Agency over the termi-
nation features as the causal factor of trauma, whereas unintentional termination is characterized as 
natural and thus qualitatively different to an abortion. Psychology provides a repertoire that victim-
izes and removes accountability from women, depoliticizes the debate, and allows antiabortionists to 
exercise repressive politics in a therapeutic and ethical disguise, managing a prowomen profile. The 
consideration of how social actors attend to social norms and cultural standards when negotiating the 
agency of particular group members is of particular importance to researchers of political psychol-
ogy and social movements.
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